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Abstract: Under what conditions are ‘holding-together’ federations created? And what
shapes the development of their territorial structures? This article answers these questions
through a comparative-historical analysis of territorial restructuring in Belgium, Spain and
the UK. It shows that ‘holding-together’ federations are created during a critical juncture
opened by a surge of regional nationalism and that the strategic responses of mainstream
parties to this threat are conditioned by their ideology. These constitutional settlements put
countries on a path of institutional development that is conditioned by mainstream parties’
ideational adaptation to the political foundations of the federation and by their power in the
system of inter-governmental relations. Even when regionalist parties regain control of the
agenda, mainstream parties’ ideological adherence to the norms enshrined in the
constitutions, coupled with their resilient power in the system of inter-governmental relations,
means that institutional change is gradual. These insights bear relevance for institutional
theory and for comparative federalism.
Even after decades of decentralization, the break-up of multinational democracies is
still on the cards, prompting responses from mainstream parties in central governments. In
Scotland, the surge of support for independence during the referendum campaign compelled
British mainstream parties to offer greater fiscal and welfare autonomy to the Scottish
government. The Spanish central government’s refusal to permit the Catalan nationalist
government to hold such an exercise has swelled the ranks of independentists, so it may yet
be forced to consider forging a new fiscal pact with Catalonia. Meanwhile, the New Flemish
Alliance (N-VA) is pursuing its goal of an independent Flanders as a member of the Belgian
federal government, by pushing for the decentralization of taxation and welfare powers.
Political decentralization thus continues to possess considerable appeal for
accommodating the demands of assertive stateless nations because it can help to ‘contain
nationalism’ (Hechter 2000). Its deployment across multinational democracies like Belgium,
Spain and the UK has brought about the restructuring of the state, in which authority has been
transferred to the regional level, paving the way for the transformation of unitary states into
what Alfred Stepan (1999) has called ‘holding-together’ federations. At a time when scholars
are studying the origins of federal systems (Ziblatt 2006), the relationship between territorial
cleavages and federalism (Amoretti and Bermeo 2004), the sources of federal stability
(Bednar 2009) or ‘authority migration’ (Gerber and Kollman 2004), and the processes of
constitutional change (Behnke and Benz 2009; Benz and Colino 2011), the study of
decentralization in multinational democracies offers a way to investigate two questions:
Under what conditions are ‘holding-together’ federations created? What then shapes the
development of their territorial structures?
These kind of questions have motivated interesting recent work that marries historical
institutionalism and comparative federalism under the rubric of ‘federal dynamics’ (Benz and
Broschek 2013). This literature has the merit of overcoming the unproductive division
between work that adopts either a long-run structural perspective (Erk 2007; Erk and Koning
2010) or a short-run actor-based perspective (Filipov et al. 2004) to explain institutional
change. First, it shows how structural factors, like the relative power of central and state
government, influence institutional choice during critical episodes such as state formation
processes in Europe (Ziblatt 2006) or economic liberalization in Latin America (Faletti
2010). Second, this literature traces the long-run influence of decisions taken at the founding
origins of federations by showing, for example, how the variable adherence to constitutional
norms by political actors led to consensus in Germany but conflict in Canada (Broschek
2010) or how the differences in the institutionalization of state governments in the U.S. and
India influenced their subsequent ability to incorporate new territories (Tillin 2015). Finally,
it identifies inter-dependencies between territorial reforms by demonstrating, for instance,
how the ‘layering’ of reforms in Italy aimed to complete the country’s post-war constitution
(Baldini and Baldi 2014) or how failed reforms in Northern Ireland produced rapid state
change by bringing conflicts closer to the ‘threshold’ of resolution (Todd 2014).
This article builds on these insights to study institutional change in Belgium, Spain
and the UK. These countries are selected from a universe of cases comprising multinational
democracies in which political leaders “came to the decision that the best way -- indeed the
only way -- to hold their countries together in a democracy would be to devolve power
constitutionally and turn their threatened polities into federations” (Stepan 1999, 22). This
universe also includes Canada, Italy and France among western countries, as well as other
multinational federal democracies such as Iraq, Ethiopia, Nigeria, South Africa, India, and
Pakistan, in which ethnic and political boundaries coincide.1
I introduce three selection criteria to specify the ‘scope conditions’ of the
investigation and facilitate a ‘structured and focused’ comparison (George and Bennett 2005).
First, I examine countries with territorially concentrated national minorities or stateless
nations endowed with enduring regional-national identities.2 These identities are incarnated
by regionalist parties that articulate demands for territorial autonomy or independence, and
whose relevance in the party system is the main driver of institutional change.3 Second, I
investigate countries that have experienced a transformation from unitary to devolved,
regionalised and federal structures, in which authority has been decentralized on a symmetric
or asymmetric basis, in function of the competition between regionalist and mainstream
parties.4 Finally, I limit the analysis to advanced parliamentary democracies with ‘structured’
party systems and programmatic forms of political competition.
I focus in this article on a sample of three countries: Belgium, Spain and the UK. The
category of ‘holding-together’ federations has been overlooked by the recent ‘federal
dynamics’ literature. Yet questions of national identity and constitutional reform have been
highly salient -- at times even existential -- matters in all three countries. They have
dominated governments’ agendas, generated chronic instability and produced a gradual and
yet significant transformation in these countries’ territorial structures. This gradual
restructuring of the state is all the more puzzling if we consider that Belgium, Spain and the
UK feature different social-structural foundations: in the number and size of stateless nations,
in their relative economic wealth, in the markers of regional national identities, in the strength
of support for independence and in the maturity of their democratic institutions. And yet, they
have all followed broadly similar processes of restructuring. How did these different
countries all arrive at such an outcome?
To answer this question, I re-examine the voluminous body of existing research on
territorial politics in each country and develop an original interpretation of their political
development that focuses on the role of two variables -- the power of mainstream parties and
their ideas about the territorial organization of the state -- during three ‘moments’ in the
process of territorial restructuring.
I show that ‘holding-together’federations are created by mainstream parties during a
critical juncture, opened by a surge of regional nationalism that disrupts their power in the
party system and subverts the existing unitary order. I find that threatened mainstream parties
whose ideology enables them to ‘credibly’ endorse decentralization deploy an
accommodative strategy and that their mainstream rivals will oppose reform, making
decentalization a salient and polarizing issue. ‘Holding-together’ federations are then
developed in a gradual fashion by mainstream parties, even in the absence of assertive
regional nationalism. I show that initial constitutional settlements put countries on a path that
is reproduced by mainstream parties’ ideational and organizational adaptation to the ‘political
foundations’ of the federation. Moreover, the decision-rule regulating territorial reform
provides mainstream parties with the power to implement their constitutional preferences.
Even when regionalist parties regain control of the agenda, mainstream parties’ ideological
adherence to the norms enshrined in the constitutions, coupled with their resilient power in
the system of inter-governmental relations, entails that institutional change is gradual. These
results yield insights that can be generalized for the study of government responses to
regional nationalism in other settings, such as Canada, France and Italy.5
This article is organised as follows. The next two sections develop an analytical
framework that distinguishes between institutional origin and development and offers a set of
propositions about the drivers of territorial reform. The subsequent three sections undertake a
comparative-historical analysis of territorial restructuring in Belgium, Spain and the UK. The
conclusion discusses the implications of these findings for institutional theory and
comparative federalism.
TERRITORIAL RESTRUCTURING
Territorial restructuring consists of the accumulation of territorial reforms that bring about the
gradual ‘re-bundling’ of authority to the regional level over the long-run (Ansell 2004).6 It
encompasses two ‘layers’: (i) an institutional layer that defines the jurisdictional allocation of
authority; and (ii) an ideational layer that incarnates a particular federal ‘vision’ (Nicolaidis
and Howse 2001) of the legitimate number and relative authority of constituent units.
Territorial restructuring unfolds over time through the gradual ‘layering’ of territorial
reforms onto existing unitary state structures, from its origins to its subsequent development
(Pierson 2004). ‘Layering’ describes the “partial renegotiation of some elements of a given
institution, while others remain in place” (Thelen 2003, 225) and occurs when there are both
agents of change pursuing innovations and constraints on imposed by the institutional context
and the presence of veto points (Mahoney and Thelen 2010, 28-9). This is characteristic of
territorial reforms, since a constitution is a ‘sticky’ institution, the continuity of which is
protected by the thresholds for ratifying amendments and the status quo bias of veto players.
As the dominant actors in party systems and governments, mainstream parties are the
veto players conditioning the timing and magnitude of territorial reform. They prefer to
maintain the status quo because of a desire to control the direction of policy-making from the
centre and of the natural inertia of the national policy systems that are decentralized. Thus, a
stylized feature of territorial restructuring is that mainstream parties decentralize policy and
administrative responsibilities before financial authority, as this enables them to maintain
oversight over regional governments’ activity (cf. Falleti 2010; Rodrigues-Pose and Gill
2003). It therefore develops sequentially during three ‘moments, each of which corresponds
to a distinct developmental trajectory and constitutes the turning points in the periodization
strategy used for structuring the comparative-historical analysis (Lieberman 2001).7
THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF REGIONAL GOVERNMENT
Institutional origins
The creation of regional structures is the ‘critical juncture’ that launches the process of
territorial restructuring. The physical existence and constitutional status of regional
governments are established; their boundaries are delimited and mapped onto territorial
groups; their rule is legitimated by direct elections. But, as these changes represents the
decisive abandonment of unitary structures, this moment is politically contentious.
Therefore, it only occurs if mainstream parties are under pressure. The ‘mechanism’
producing institutional change during this moment is the strategic reponse of mainstream
parties to a surge of regional nationalism. Mainstream parties experience a disruption to their
power in the party system due to the rising threat of regionalist parties whose ‘relevance’ in
the party system enables them to set the agenda (Toubeau 2011).
The responses of mainstream parties are divided due to differences in their incentive
and ability to accommodate regionalist parties. Threatened mainstream parties will deploy an
‘accommodative’ strategy by adopting a pro-decentralist position, to challenge regionalist
parties ‘ownership’ of the territorial issue and realise their vote and office-seeking goals
(Sorens 2009; Toubeau and Massetti 2013). But, whether they can do this depends on
whether their ideology enables them to adopt a ‘credible’ decentralist policy, i.e. one for
which there is a tradition of ideas favourable to decentralization that renders sincere its effort
to contest regionalist parties’ ownership of the issue (Alonso 2012). Historic templates of
territorial autonomy are thus the ‘critical antecedent’ that shape the ideas of mainstream
parties regarding territorial reform (Slater and Simmons 2010). In contrast, mainstream
parties that are either not threatened or cannot adopt a ‘credible’ policy will deploy an
‘adversarial’ strategy (Meguid 2008). The creation of regional structures is thus likely to be a
salient and polarizing issue of competition.
Regional structures are created amid a short and concentrated period of activity
(Capoccia and Kelemen 2007), by parties that participate in ‘constitutional coalitions’ at the
centre, the breadth of which is informed by the formal and informal decision-rules regulating
constitutional reform. The expectation is that the range of plausible options available during
these negotiations are shaped by mainstream parties territorial policies and that the substance
of the option that is eventually chosen reflects the relative power actors involved in the
bargaining and the compromise between their positions.
Insititutional development
‘Holding-together’ federations thereafter embark on a process of institutional development.
During the construction of regional government, mainstream parties at the centre grant
legislative autonomy to regional governments, in areas relating to regional identity and well-
being, such culture, education and economic development, and the administrative and
financial resources to deliver these policies. Then, during the deepening of regional
authority, regional governments are furnished with legislative powers in welfare and fiscal
matters, both of which faffect the redistributive functions of the state.
The drivers of institutional change during these moments are shaped by the new
institutional context (Faletti and Lynch 2009). Specifically, the power of mainstream parties
and their ideas about territorial reform are conditioned by two variables introduced during
the previous moment: the ‘political foundations’ of the federation and the ‘decision-rule’
regulating territorial reform. The first variable refers to the ‘cultural categories’ (Steensland
2000) in the ideational layer that define the constituent parts of the state, their
correspondence to culturally distinct territorial groups, the (a) symmetric allocation of
authority and adherence to the federal principle, which recognises the individisble or shared
nature of sovereingty. The second variable refers to the ‘negotiation mode’ (Petersohn et al.
2015), which defines the uni-lateral, bi-lateral or multi-lateral nature of interactions between
participants in the process of constitutional change and shapes the power relations between
the constituent units and the central government. These two variables give the arrangements
established during the creation of regional structures the ‘bite’ (Capoccia 2016) that
conditions the long-run development of ‘holding-together’ federations.
The causal mechanisms through which this ‘bite’ is felt are the adjustment of the
power and ideas of mainstream parties to the new institutional arrangements. Path-
dependency models in historical institutionalism predict that actors will invest considerable
effort to adjust to new institutional environments, generating ‘increasing returns’ for those
actors and self-reinforcing effects for those institutions (Pierson 2000, 252). Mainstream
parties adjust to regional structures because of their propensity for what Peter Mair (1983)
called “adaptation and control.” Accordingly, they adjust their policy position to reflect their
acceptance of the political foundations of the federation and adapt their organizational
structures in order to compete effectively in regional elections (Deschouwer 2003; Hopkin
2003).8 In addition, they use their power in this system of inter-governmental relations to
steer institutional change. These two mechanisms underpin a period of ‘institutional
reproduction.’ This entails the absence of any attempt at reversing the status quo and the
presence of territorial reforms situated on the same developmental trajectory, undertaken
without the external forces of regional nationalism responsible for the original creation of
‘holding-together’ federations (Mahoney 2000, 515).
We expect this equilibrium to be disrupted if there is an undoing of the mechanisms
that underpin its reproduction (Thelen 1999), i.e, if there is a disruption in the power of
mainstream parties and in their willingness to adjust their ideas. Specifically, we expect a
‘reactive sequence’ (Mahoney 2000, 527) to be unleashed if regionalist parties are able to
wrest back control of the agenda. Mainstream parties will respond to this renewed threat, but
only within the boundaries of their ideational commitment to the political foundations of the
federations.  Moreover, if they retain power in the system of inter-governmental relations,
they can ensure that pressures for reform are channelled into a gradual institutional change.
THE CREATION OF REGIONAL STRUCTURES
The regionalist threat: setting the agenda
Under what conditions are ‘holding-together’ federations created? Regional structures were
created during a critical juncture in which regionalist parties exercised the ‘relevance’
necessary to put territorial reform on the agenda.
During the 1980s, the independentist Scottish National Party (SNP) adopted a left-
wing agenda and gained support in the Labour party’s strongholds (Brand et al. 1994). By
1987, this threat was amplified by the territorial imbalance of support that increased
Labour’s sensitivity to party competition in Scotland (Johnston et al. 1988). In Belgium, the
Volskunie (VU), the Rassemblement Wallon (RW), and the Front Démocratique des
Francophones (FDF) emerged across the political spectrum during the ‘critical’ elections of
1965 and 1968 (Delruelle et al. 1970), threatening all mainstream parties. During the
democratic transition in Spain, the regionalist parties of Catalonia and the Basque country
appeared on the left and centre. Moreover, the hung parliament resulting from the 1977
founding elections, gave Convergencia Democratic per Catalunya (CDC) and the Partido
Nacional Vasco (PNV) the coalition potential necessary to force the Unión del Centro
Democratico (UDC) to open up participation in the constituent assembly (Maravall and
Santamaria 1986).
The mainstream response: the role of ‘credibility’
The mainstream response to this threat differed according to their ideology. Accommodative
strategies were deployed by threatened centre-left mainstream parties that could adopt
‘credible’ pro-decentralist territorial policies.
Opposition Social Democratic parties systematically deployed an accommodative
strategy. The British Labour party responded to the SNP’s threat in 1988 by re-asserting its
commitment to devolution for Scotland and endorsing the establishment of a Scottish
Constitutional Convention (SCC). The policy was made ‘credible’ by the fact that devolution
was ‘unfinished business’ from the 1970s and by Labour’s historic role in leading the
Scottish National Convention (SNC) in the 1920s (Mitchell 1996). The Partido Socialista
Obrero Espanol (PSOE)’s territorial policy was to create a symmetric federal constitution
that recognised national identities (Blas Guerrero 1978). This policy resonated with its
support for a federation of ‘Iberian’ nationalities and and its endorsement of the Estado
Integral during the Second Republic (1931-39), which included a Catalan statute of
autonomy (Carr 1982). The Parti Socialiste Belge (PSB)’s response to the RW was to
demand the devolution of economic powers to three regions: Flanders, Wallonia and
Brussels. This policy was consistent with its earlier backing of a linguistic frontier in the
1920s and with its proposal for federal reform dating to the late 1940s (Falony 2006).
Centrist parties in government also deployed accommodative strategies. When the
Parti Social Chrétien-Christelijke Volkspartij (PSC-CVP) was threathed by the VU, it
abandoned its unitarist stance and adopted a policy of cultural regionalism founded upon the
Flemish and Francophone nations. This resonated with the Catholic party’s support for the
linguistic legislation in the interwar and post-war periods that consolidated two unilingual
communities (Gerard 1998). Similarly, the UCD preferred maintaining a unitary state but
agreed to federal reform when forced to open up negotiations. This shift was consistent with
its recognition that a symmetrical form of regional decentralisation would be necessary for
legitimating the new democratic regime (Hopkin 1999).
In contrast, mainstream parties on the right which championed the state’s national
identiy adopted an ‘adversarial’ strategy. The British Conservative party opposed Labour’s
plans for devolution and remained committed to the Union, a stance that harked back to its
condemnation of Irish Home Rule in the 19th century as a ‘slippery slope’ to separatism
(Seawright 1999). The conservative Alianza Popular (AP) foresaw only a limited degree of
power for provinces within a unitary state and opposed the creation of regions and the
recognition of nationalities, a stace that resonated with integrismo, a brand of nationalism that
promoted devotion to the unity and sovereignty of the Spanish nation (Preston 1973). The
significance of ‘credibility’ as a constraint on strategic repositioning was evident in the case
of the Belgian Parti Libéral (PL). Predominant among the French-speaking bourgeois elite of
Brussels, the PL was the long-time guardian of the unitary Belgian state, viewing the French
language as the vehicle of state building and national integration (Lorwin 1966). Therefore,
in spite of the threat of the FDF, the PL maintained its unitarist position.
Partisan bargaining and institutional outcomes
How did these divergent mainstream responses result in institutional change? The set of
territorial arrangements reflected the power of mainstream parties involved in the
‘constitutional coalition’ and the compromise between their territorial policies.
The blueprint for devolution to Scotland had been developed by the SNC (1989-95), a
cross-party forum that included prominent actors from Scottish civil society but was
dominated by the Labour party. In 1998, the Labour government passed three bills that
‘layered’ territorial autonomy onto the existing administrative offices for Scotland, Wales and
Northern Ireland, giving them a directly elected parliament and government with legislative
authority. The ‘double asymmetry’ (Tierney 2007) built into the ‘political foundations’ of this
settlement between devolved units and between these units and England, which was not given
regional structures, reflected differences in the intensity of regional nationalism and the
longevity of regional administrative offices. The decision-rule regulating territorial reform
was however firmly centralist: the constitution remained a reserved matter and sovereignty
was retained in Westminster.
In Belgium, the constitutional reform of 1970 was far more circumscribed. The
threshold for amending the constitution required an oversized coalition comprising all three
mainstream parties. In 1968-1970, the PSC-CVP and PSB brokered a reform that reflected
their respective preferences for establishing two cultural councils and three regional councils
as the ‘political foundations’ of Belgium. But while this asymmetry between entities offered a
way to reconcile their contrasting federal ‘visions,’ these parties nevertheless differed over
the type of competences which each constituent unit should be allocated and over the status
of the Brussels region in the federal architecture. Thus, the reform only recognised the legal
existence of councils, but did not define their autonomy or provide them with direct
legitimacy. Instead, it stipulated a new decision-rule through which this could be achieved in
the future. These were introduced by the PL, which supported the reform in exchange for
consociational devices that institutionalised linguistic parity (Grootaers 1972).
The crafters of the Spanish constitution followed a similar route but produced a more
complete settlement. The distribution of partisan power after the founding elections,
combined with a concern for strengthening the legitimacy of Spain’s new democratic
constitution (Sole-Tura 1985), pushed the UCD to open up participation in the constituent
assembly. However, there was no formal requirement that all participants consent to the final
text. The crux of the agreement was thus a compromise between the positions of moderate
mainstream and regionalist parties: the PSOE, UCD and CDC. The ‘political foundations’ of
the Spanish ‘State of Autonomies’ were  Autonomous Communities (ACs). A temporal
asymmetry in their authority was introduced between the ‘historic’ regions of Spain-
Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia- which would be entitled to follow a faster route
to autonomy than the non-historic regions. However, this was viewed by mainstream parties
as a temporary measure designed to placate nationalist demands. In a similar spirit,
recognition was given to Spain’s ‘nationalities’ in the constitution’s pre-amble. But this stood
alongside commitments to the unity and indivisibility of Spain and the sovereignty of the
Spanish people. This centralist flavour was reflected in the decision-rule regulating territorial
reform: the territorial delimitation of ACs would be left to municipal councils, while the
content of ACs’ legislative autonomy would be in their Statutes of Autonomy, which would
require ratification by the central government through ‘organic’ legislation (Aja 1999).
THE CONSTRUCTION OF REGIONAL GOVERNMENT
The ideational adaptation of mainstream parties
The arrangements selected at the origins of ‘holding-together’ federations set countries on a
path upon which regional governments- initially designed to ‘contain’ nationalism- became
actively constructed by the mainstream parties that created them.
The construction of the Spanish State of Autonomies was undertaken by the PSOE and
the Partido Popular (PP)- the successor party of the AP, which experienced a convergence in
their territorial policies. During its time in office (1982-96), the PSOE oversaw the transfer of
legislative powers, fiscal and administrative resources to ACs, steering the State of
Autonomies towards a uniform system of autonomy coupled with fiscal centralization, in
accordance with its preference for symmetric decentralization and inter-territorial solidarity.
This policy was congruent with the party’s federal organizational structures, which were
gradually reinforced by its victory in successive regional elections and the consequent
emergence of regional presidents or ‘barons’ as power-brokers in the party’s congress
(Gillespie 1989). The PP came to embrace the ‘political foundations’ of the State of
Autonomies: in a bid to enhance its electability and capture central office, it underwent an
ideological renewal in the late 1980s in which it relaxed its conservative and nationalist
profile (Montero 1988). The party’s organizational structures remained fairly centralized, but
the leadership recognized the value of holding regional office and so provided regional
branches with the autonomy for competing in regional elections (Fabre 2008).
The transfer of legislative powers to cultural and regional councils in Belgium was
undertaken by the three mainstream parties which, during the 1970s, adopted decentralist
territorial policies and split their organizational structures along linguistic lines. This split was
due to internal differences between the linguistic wings of each party over the ‘political
foundations’ of Belgian federalism (Dewachter 1987). This tied their electoral fate to the
regional arena and created incentives for ‘outbidding’ on the territorial dimension,
exacerbating differences between linguistic communities over Belgium’s ‘political
foundations.’ The Flemish CVP projected the vision of a ‘federalism of union’ based on two
directly elected entities with economic and cultural competences, in which Brussels would be
incorporated into Flemish territory. In contrast, the Francophone PSB proposed that, alongside
cultural councils, there should be three directly elected regional councils with powers over
economic policy. But the most remarkable adaptation was witnessed by the francophone
Liberal Party which abandoned its erstwhile unitarist position and supported decentralization
on the basis of three regions, with a fully-fledged Brussels region.
The issue to emerge from the Labour government’s devolution settlement was the
limitation of the Welsh assembly’s autonomy.9 This was unsatisfactory to Labour party
assembly members who advocated a reform that would enable the assembly to develop
primary legislation. This adjustment in the party’s territorial policy was facilitated by the
reform of its organization, which adapted to devolved electoral politics and competition with
the regionalist party Plaid Cymru (PC), by providing its regional branches with control over
leadership election, candidate selection and manifesto formulation (Laffin and Shaw 2007, 62-
4). This was filip to the autonomist current within the Welsh Labour party and its agenda for
reform. This adaptation was mirrored in Scotland, where the party’s regional branch  was also
given greater self-rule. The most notable adaptation was that experienced by the Conservative
party, which accepted the reality of devolution, providing at the same time its Scottish and
Welsh branches with the space to prepare regional elections (Bratberg 2009, 67-71).
The power of mainstream parties in inter-governmental relations
Mainstream parties’ predominance in the system of inter-governmental relations provided
them with power to steer institutional change.This was very clear in Wales. Territorial reform
was initiated when the Welsh Labour party established the Richard Commission (2002-04) to
report on the powers of the Welsh Assembly. The Labour central government then passed the
Government of Wales Act (2006), paving the way for an minimal adjustment in the legislative
powers of the Welsh Assembly in three phases (Trench 2006). The modesty of this reform
was due to resilient centralist instincts among the central branch of the party. The autonomist
current within the Welsh branch could thus only endorse gradual change (Wyn Jones and
Scully 2011). Moreover, the decision rule and bilateral negotiation mode gave the central
government discretion over the content of the reform. Thus, the Welsh Labour party’s
response to the Commission’s recommendation were quickly taken up by the Secretary of
State for Wales and the bill was then drafted by the central Wales office (Trench 2008). The
central government thus retained control over every phase: from defining the scope of the
assembly’s ‘enhanced’ powers to enabling the assembly to organise a referendum.
The Spanish constitution also conferred to the central government a dominant position
in the system of inter-governmental relations.10 When combined with the dominance of the
PSOE during the 1980s, these rules provided the central government with substantial
discretion. This was evident during three episodes of reform that gradually transferred
legislative autonomy to ACs. The Leyes Orgánica de Transferencias (LET) ratified by the
PSOE in 1982 permitted Valencia and Canary Islands to follow the ‘fast route’ to autonomy,
thereby diluting the distinction between historic and non-historic regions (Montilla Martos
1996). This was continued when the PSOE and PP collaborated in forging the Pactos
Autonomicos (1989-92) that transferred reserved competences to the ten non-historic regions
that had followed the ‘slow route’ (Munoz Machado 1992). Lastly, the PP maintained this
format of decentralization. In 1997, it harmonized the decentralization of health policy across
ACs, the transfer of which had hitherto been fragmented over successive waves.
Constituent entities in Belgium were not involved in the elaboration of the ‘special’
laws that specified the content of their legislative autonomy. Instead, the decision-rule
assigned veto power to the two largest mainstream parties in the national government- the
CVP and PS- providing each one with a veto over territorial reform. The compromise between
their positions was evident in the asymmetric format of the 1980 reform: the PS obtained the
decentralization of competences in economic policy to regional councils, while the CVP
obtained its long-held demand for a fusion between the Flemish regional and community
councils. In the absence of any agreement on the fate of Brussels in the federal architecture,
the issue was put ‘on ice’ (Brassine 1980). These two parties also shepherded the two
constitutional reforms of 1988-89 and 1992-93. In these transactions, the PS obtained the
statuts of fully-fledged region for Brussels and further economic policy competences for the
Walloon region, while the CVP acquired greater autonomy for the Flemish council in health,
education and scientific research (Arcq et al. 1991).11
THE DEEPENING OF REGIONAL AUTHORITY
Regionalist parties wrest control of the agenda
A ‘reactive sequence’ was unleashed when regionalist parties wrested control of the agenda
and made claims for fiscal autonomy and the recognition of their sovereignty.
The SNP’s landmark victories in the Scottish elections of 2007 and 2011 gave it the
chance to govern Scotland. The SNP ran both campaigns on a centre-left independentist
platform, putting forward pledges to increase public investment in social services and
promising a referendum on independence. In 2007, it launched ‘The National Conversation’ -
- a public consultation exercise on Scotland’s constitution (Harvey and Lynch 2012). But the
referendum was only held after 2011, when the SNP secured a parliamentary majority. The
SNP capitalised on its landslide victory in the 2015 general election to pressure British
mainstream parties to make good on their campaign pledges to devolve powers to Scotland.
In Spain, regionalist parties set the agenda on two occasions. In the mid-1990s, CiU
and PNV benefited from a hung national parliaments and from their pivotal position to wield
coalition relevance. They traded ‘policy for authority’ (Heller 2002) -- supporting PSOE and
PP minority governments in exchange for greater fiscal responsibility to ACs. Then, in the
mid-2000s, the Basque and Catalan governments issued plans for reforming their Statutes of
Autonomy. The PNV government presented the ‘Ibarretxe Plan’: a proposal for the ‘free
association’ between the Basque Community and the Spanish state (Keating and Bray 2006).
The Catalan tripartite coalition government, which included the left-wing nationalist
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC), elaborated a new Statute of Autonomy that
would provide Catalonia with greater legislative competences, fiscal autonomy and the
recognition of its status as a nation. When the PSOE minority government came to rely on the
ERC’s parliamentary support in 2004, it opened a dialogue with the Catalan government.
The Niewe-Vlaamse Alliantie (N-VA), the right-wing successor party of the VU
(Govaert 2002), set the agenda when it established an electoral cartel with the Christen-
Democratisch en Vlaams (CD&V), the successor party of the CVP, to compete in the Flemish
elections of 2004. At the basis of their alliance was the pursuit of a resolution passed by the
Flemish parliament in 1999, which called for the complete decentralization of competences in
the areas of welfare and taxation and the split of the electoral district of Brussels, which
straddled the Flemish and Brussels Region and represented the last impediment to their
confederal ‘vision’ of Belgium constituted of two nations (Pagano 2000). These demands
were projected when the cartel secured a victory in the federal elections of 2007 and
amplified in 2010, when the N-VA emerged as the largest party in the federal parliament.
The mainstream response: ideational and institutional constraints
The scope of institutional change ushered in by mainstream parties during this moment was
bound by their ideational commitments to the ‘political foundations’ of the federation, while
their pre-dominance in the system of inter-governmental relations.
After its stunning defeat in Scotland, the Labour party sought to counter the erosion of
its support by responding to the SNP’s initiatives. But it was committed to keeping the
constitution a reserved matter and could therefore not countenance a referendum on
independence. Moreover, it espoused principles of inter-territorial equity and was reluctant to
endorse any changes to the Scottish government’s funding formula. As an intermediary
strategy, the Labour party established the ‘Calman’ commission on Scottish devolution, with
support from the Scottish Conservatives and Liberal-Democrat parties. Calman’s
recommentations formed the basis of the Scotland Act (2012), which introduced a modest
enhancement in the Scottish government’s tax-varying powers. A deeper reform that included
powers over income tax and welfare policy was then introduced with the Scotland Act
(2016). The blueprint for this Act were the recommendations of the Smith Commission, set-
up by the Conservative government in the aftermath of the independence referendum. In both
cases, the bi-lateral decision-rule gave the central government the power to shape the bills
and to impose them on the Scottish government. The Sewel Convention gave the Scottish
government the power to potentially block the bills through a ‘legislative consent motion’
(Poirier 2001). But the Scottish government could not ultimately influence the content of the
Acts and was thus bound to accept the gradual reforms introduced by the British government.
Spanish mainstream parties’ ideology could accommodate nationalist demands for
introducing stronger link between central government transfers and ACs’ expenditures. For
the PP, this accorded with an existing commitment to bring about a more effective territorial
financing model.. The PSOE was more ambivalent. The federalist current had developed
proposals for enhancing AC’s fiscal co-responsibility (Puhle 2001). But, the PSOE was also
committed to upholding the principles of solidarity and sufficiency enshrined in the
constitution. Moreover, the party’s strong electoral ties to the South and its powerful ‘barons’
perpetuated the fear that fiscal autonomy would exacerbate regional inequality (Orte and
Wilson 2009). This reticence was felt especially in 2005, when the Catalan parliament’s draft
new Statute of Autonomy included a proposal for full taxation autonomy (Colino 2009). The
decision-rules for reforming the common financing system (Ley Organica de Financiacion
de las Communidades Autonomas (LOFCA)) and the Statutes of Autonomy provided the
central parliament with the power to control the magnitude of institutional change: the
‘cession’ of shared income taxes accorded to the Catalan government was thus only gradually
increased over this period to 15 percent in 1993, 30 percent in 1997 and 50 percent in 2005.
In contrast, any accommodation of the symbolic recognition of sovereignty was ruled
out by both mainstream parties as inimical to the Spanish federation’s ‘political foundation.’
By 2000, the PP declared the process of decentralization to have been ‘completed’ and put
forward a vigorous defence of the unity and sovereignty of the Spanish nation (Nunez Seixas
2001). The PSOE’s ideology was equally hostile to sovereigntist claims. Thus, in 2005, both
parties rejected the ‘Ibarrexte Plan’ as unconstitutional. The PSOE’s representatives in the
parliament followed suit, removing any reference to Catalonia’s status as a nation in the
Catalan Statute of Autonomy. Moreover, the PSOE also encouraged statute reform in other
ACs to bring some degree of symmetry to the overall process (Keating and Wilson 2009).
In Belgium, the main source of constraint on the territorial reform envisaged by the
CD&V and the N-VA were the Francophone parties in central government, in particular the
Parti Socialiste (PS). The PS had realized its main ambitions for the regionalization of
Belgium in 1995 with the creation of the Brussels region, the direct election of regional
councils and the transfer of economic policy competences. It declared thereafter that it was
“asking nothing,” impeding a potential round of bargaining with Flemish parties over the
‘hollowing out’ of the central government (Dandoy et al. 2013). Moreover, the PS’s electoral
implantation in the relative poorer region of Wallonia meant that it strongly opposed fiscal
autonomy. Furthermore, it adopted a strongly Belgian identity which reflected the higher
sense of belonging to Belgium among Walloons (Billiet et al. 2006). The ambitious demands
of the CD&V and N-VA, coupled with the PS’s opposition to reform and their mutual veto
power over constitutional change was the source of prolonged deadlock from 2007 to 2011.
The deadlock was reinforced by the constraints generated by the vertical incongruence the
regional and federal coalition governments (Deschouwer 2009). The crisis was finally
resolved with the sixth constitutional reform in November 2011. This was, once again,
brokered by the CD&V and PS, and ultimately required a change in the posture of the PS and
its acceptance to to split the electoral district of Brussels and to gradually decentralize some
aspects of welfare and taxation to the regions.
CONCLUSION
This comparative-historical analysis of the origins and development of territorial
restructuring in Belgium, Spain and the UK has produced two findings that have important
bearing for historical institutionalist theory and comparative federalism.
The first finding is that ‘holding-together’ federations are created during a ‘critical
juncture’ as a result of mainstream parties’ strategic responses to a surge of regional
nationalism. The analysis of institutional outcomes during this episode lends support to
agency-based conceptualizations of critical junctures in which political actors behave
strategically and select institutions from a range of options, constrained by the political and
historical context (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007). This article found that mainstream parties’s
ideology conditioned the ‘credibility’ of their position on decentralization and their choice of
strategies, and that the range of institutional ‘options’ from which mainstream parties could
select was shaped by the historic templates of territorial autonomy incorporated into their
ideological profile. This implies that the ‘antecedent conditions’ are not necessarily of a
structural or material kind (Slater and Simmons 2010), but can also operate at the ideational
level (Blyth 2002). The mental maps that parties inherit is therefore essential to
understanding the range of feasible institutional outcomes.
The substance of these outcomes confirms the expectations of models of critical
junctures that posit a significant causal role for ‘agency’ and ‘contingency’ in determining
institutional ‘selection’ (Mahoney 2000). Institutional ‘choices’ were determined by the
distribution of power between mainstream parties participating in ‘constitutional coalitions’
and by the compromises between their territorial policies. Where ‘contingency’ played an
influential role was in the way that election results shaped the relative power of mainstream
actors in the coalition. This was evident in the case of Spain, where the UCD accepted a more
ambitious territorial reform due to the parliamentary fragmentation thrown up by the
country’s founding elections, and in Belgium, where the CVP and PSB were forced to
negotiate with each other’s contrasting federal ‘visions’.
The outcomes produced during critical junctures put ‘holding-together’ federations
onto the path of institutional development. This article offers evidence of endogeneous
institutional change (Mahoney and Thelen 2010; Streeck and Thelen 2005; Thelen 2003) by
showing how territorial reforms occurred following a critical juncture, within certain path-
dependent boundaries. The contours of those boundaries were defined by the ideas and power
of mainstream parties- by what they considered to be consistent with the constitution and by
the discretion they exercised over the implementation of reforms. This suggests that power-
based and legitimacy-based explanations of institutional ‘reproduction’ (Mahoney 2000) are
especially germane to the study of institutional change ‘holding-together’ federations.
Change in the distribution of power between regionalist and mainstream forces is the fulcrum
underlying institutional change, while contrasting normative conceptions of a federation’s
‘political foundations’ bounds constitutional negotiations between parties and levels of
authority. In contrast, institutional change in coming-together federations, such as
Switzerland or Germany, is far less frequent- a testament to the stability inducing effects of
vertically and horizontally integrated party systems. Moreover, the initiation and substance
of reforms are guided predominantly by utilitarian and functional criteria (Broschek 2015).
Moreover, this article shows that the ideas and power of mainstream parties were
shaped by the norms and rules institutionalized at the moment of creation, giving
foundational decisions the ‘bite’ to condition long-run institutional development. Mainstream
parties invested in the new territorial order, adaptating their ideology and organization to the
new ‘political foundations’ of the federation, and exercised primacy in the system of inter-
governmental relations. The effects of this legacy are evident in all three countries:
mainstream parties could conceive of enhancing the legislative and fiscal autonomy of
regions, but used their veto power to steer reforms in the gradual way. This predominance
persisted even during ‘reactive sequence’ when regionalist parties regained control of the
agenda. The distinct federal ‘visions’ espoused by nationalist parties and their claims to
sovereignty were more difficult to accommodate, however, since they ran counter to the
political foundations to which mainstream parties had come to adhere.
These findings highlight the necessity of adopting an actor-centred comparative and
historical perspective when studying institutional change in ‘holding-together’ federations.
Structural accounts of federalism that study the effect of ethno-linguistic cleavages on
processes of (de)centralization (Erk 2007; Erk and Koning 2010) can explain the direction of
‘authority migration’ across countries and policy sectors. But by overlooking the role of
political agency in driving institutional change, they cannot explain either the conditions that
prompt the initial creation of regional structures or the timing and content of the subsequent
reforms that shape their development. Such accounts must be complemented by a focus on
the micro-foundations of institutional change, namely, the strategic behavior of parties.
Elements of such a focus have been provided by scholars that examine the
motivations underlying party strategizing on single-issues such as decentralization. This
article corroborates Alonso’s (2012) insight that the battle for ‘credibility’ changes after the
first round of regionalist challenge, by showing that all mainstream parties exhibited some
degree of ‘credibility’ when introducing territorial reforms during the process of institutional
development. But it also traces the sources of partisan ‘credibility,’ not simply to a pre-
disposition towards decentralization, but rather to critical juncture’s ‘antecedent conditions’
and to the ‘political foundations’ that were institutionalized during the creation of
regionalized structures. This deeper tracing allows this article, moreover, to explain the
substance of institutional change over time. To do so, this articles focused on the politics of
constitutional change during successive episodes of reform, demonstrating the relationship
that exists between these episodes and illustrating how the institutions of ‘holding-together’
federations can be at the source of their own transformation. In this way, the article aims in
this way to contribute to the burgeoning ‘federal dynamics’ literature by explaining
institutional choices at the origins of ‘holding-together’ federations and the long-run
influence of these choice on the development of federations.
These insights can be generalized to other federal and regionalized Western states that
have undergone a comparable transformation over recent decades. Italy’s experience of
managing territorial cleavages in its transition to democracy was similar to Spain’s: a
distinction was established between ordinary and special status regions; the autonomy of
which was defined in principle in regional statutes of autonomy, but was dependent in
practice on central government’s decision to transfer competences. In contrast to Spain,
Belgium and the UK, however, the creation of regionalized structures and construction of
regional government was immediately impeded by the polarization of the Italian party system
and had to wait for thirty years for the convergent ideational and organizational adapation of
the largest mainstream parties. It was not until the eruption of the Lega Nord in the Italian
party system in the early 1990s that territorial reforms began in earnest, resulting in the
gradual deepending of regional authority in the constitutional reform of 2001.
The creation provinces in Canada and regions in France arose from completely
opposite origins and processes: a coming-together of former colonies into the Canadian
confederation and the top-down creation of homogeneous units defined mainly for economic
planning purposes. It was in this context that arose modern political nationalism in Quebec
and cultural regionalism in Brittany and Corsica: regional elections provided regionalist
parties with a platform from which to project demands for independence, autonomy and
recognition. But the constraints imposed by the power and ideas of mainstream parties
remained important in defining the scope of institutional change in both contexts. The
provincial vision of Canada and veto power of provinces in the process of constitutional
reform resulted in little formal changes to the autonomy of Quebec, while the resilient
jacobinist vision of the French territory and predominant authority of the French central
government enabled to reconfigure the boundaries and powers of regions.
The conclusions also bear relevance for constitutional settlements currently being
forged in nascent and potential ‘holding-together’ federations beyond the Western world,
such as Sri Lanka, Nepal and Myanmar, that are undergoing critical episodes of change
following civil wars and transitions from military rule. Negotiators may wish to consider how
their country’s past attempts at grappling with ethnic and territorial diversity offers templates
of territorial autonomy that could furnish workable institutional ‘options.’ Given the
unprecedented nature of these moments, the climate of debate is likely to be polarized. But
the cases of Spain and Belgium, and to a lesser extent the UK, show that these negotiations
can be successful, if there is willingness to establish consensus among moderate political
forces and forge compromises based on the principle of asymmetry (Horowitz 2000; 2002).
Furthermore, the investments that mainstream political actors make in adapting to
new territorial structures is what underpins their ‘lock-in,’ that is, the basis of their
reproduction and stability. In particular, the adaptation of erstwhile opponents of
decentralization results in the vanishing of any actors that aim to reverse the status quo. The
absence of this adaptation, on the other hand, may augur the end of the federation, either by
way of re-centralization, or by way of confrontation with regional nationalism, and break-up.
A crucial final lesson for crafters of ‘holding-together’ federations elsewhere is thus to
recognize that the steady unfolding of decentralization follows a path-dependent trajectory,
structured by the kind of norms and rules put into place during the moment of creation, that
maintains or relinquishes the authority of the political centre in managing this process.
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NOTES
1 I use the term ‘holding-together’ federation as a conceptual shorthand, mindful that only
Canada, Belgium and India are classified as federations. The other countries are not strictly
federations in the classical sense, as they do not all define themselves as federations and lack
the basic trappings of a federation, such as the presence of a territorial upper chamber or
sovereign constituent entities that must consent to a reform of their authority.
However, using Stepan’s term as a short-hand can be justified for a couple of reasons. First,
federations can be considered to share a ‘family resemblance’ with no one single attribute
common to all empirical types. Canada for instance, is a federation, but lacks a territorial
upper chamber. Also, it is common to view sovereignty as ‘shared’ even in the devolved
union and regionalized states, such as the UK and Spain, in which parties in regional
government can often initiate reforms to their authority, but must negotiate these reforms
with other forces in central government. Second, all these countries match Stepan’s definition
of a ‘holding-together’ federation insofar as the underlying logic and key characteristic of this
type of polity is regional self-rule: a devolution of authority from the central government to
the regional government in a manner that accommodates regional nationalist claims.
2 This excludes the study of ethnic minority groups that advance primarily linguistic claims,
i.e. demands for the recognition and use of their native language in the public sphere, such as
the Swedish-speakers in Finland, the Russian-speaking minority in Estonia and Latvia, and
the Hungarian minority in Slovakia and Romania.
3 Regionalist parties, also referred to as ethno-regionalist parties (De Winter and Turan 1998),
non-state-wide parties (Pallares et al. 1997), or stateless regionalist and nationalist parties
(Hepburn 2009), are policy-seeking parties that mobilize electoral support in a geographically
delimited area on the basis a territorial group’s distinct identity by demanding territorial
autonomy or independence. While there is a clear distinction between these two options,
regionalist parties can change positions or remain ambiguous regarding their ultimate
political ambition. The relevance of regionalist parties in the party system is the main driver
of institutional change, and varies both across countries and within countries over time.
4 Mainstream parties are state-wide parties that represent the ideology of the main families
(Communist, Social Democratic, Ecological, Liberal, Christian Democratic, Conservative,
Radical Right) and seek to gain representation across the country, in all elections at all levels
(Hopkin and Van Houten 2009; Swenden and Maddens 2009; Stepan, Linz and Yadav 2011).
5 Theses countries offer a broad range of variation along the main driver and the observed
outcome. In France, the representative party of Bretton and Corsican nationalism are not
relevant in national party competition and France has remained a unitary state. In Italy, the
territorial cleavage was largely dormant in the post-war era until the early 1990s, when the
surge of the Lega Nord (LN) induced a constitutional reform that decentralized authority
power to ordinary regions. Canada is unusual in that it was established as a ‘coming-together’
federation in 1847, long before the rise of the Parti Quebecois (PQ) in the late 1960s. This
offered the party with an arena from which to organize two referendums on independence
(1980, 1995). While unsuccessful in producing the desired outcome, they enabled the Quebec
government to negotiate informal changes in its relation to the federal government.
6 This is a more narrow definition of the term than has been used previously by authors such
as Keating (1998; 2013) to describe a more comprehensive process encompassing the
establishment of a regional government, as well as a re-scaling of  productive systems, public
policies, interest group organisation, social group mobilisation, party political strategies and
mass attitudes.
7 Two caveats must be borne in mind. First, the sequence of ‘moments’ does not necessarily
correspond with the number of territorial reforms, i.e. with the discrete attempts of
mainstream parties to under take institutional change, as each ‘moment’ could encompass
several reforms. Second, there can be an overlap of ‘moments’ at any given time. For
instance, some constituent entities could be dealing with their construction, while others are
still being created.
8 This programmatic and organisational adjustment is by no means linear or universal across
parties, as they are influenced by country-level and party-level factors.  Ideology continues to
influence party positioning, as mainstream parties may resist accommodation on the cultural
dimension. State structures will determine the nature of organisational reform (the presence
of shared-rule and self-rule within parties), while party origin, ideology and competitive
context will shape the timing and scope of organisational reforms (Detterbeck 2012; Swenden
and Maddens 2009).
9 It exercised secondary legislative powers only, forcing it to enter negotiations with
Westminster on each bill that affected a devolved function. Moreover, to introduce legislative
change, the assembly needed to insert its bill in the British government’s crowded agenda
10 The decision-rule for ratifying Statutes of Autonomy provides the constitutional committee
of the central parliament with the right to ratify the final draft by way of organic law,
requiring an absolute majority. Moreover, the central parliament also has the right to
unilaterally approve organic laws that transfer reserved competences to ACs.
11 This power was not unfettered, as regionalist parties were invited to enter government for
the purpose of meeting the qualified majorities: the RW in 1974, the FDF and VU in 1977-78,
and the VU in 1992. These parties played a constructive role in advancing proposals for the
regionalization process, particular over the pernicious problem of  Brussels, but their
proposals were ultimately co-opted by mainstream parties.
